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Building Sector-Based Consensus: 
A Review of the EPA’s Common Sense Initiative 
 
Cary Coglianese* and Laurie K. Allen** 
 
 From 1994-1998, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) conducted what then-
Administrator Carol Browner called a “bold experiment” in regulatory reinvention. The agency 
brought together representatives from six industrial sectors and sought to forge a consensus 
within each sector on innovations in environmental management and policy. In this paper, we 
examine the impact of EPA’s sector-focused, consensus-based program called the Common 
Sense Initiative (CSI) to determine how well it achieved the agency's goals of improving 
technological innovation and environmental results. 
 The paper begins by examining the structure and goals of CSI and then considers its 
relatively modest accomplishments. The paper concludes with a discussion of a key factor that 
explains the Initiative’s failure to achieve its most ambitious goals: EPA’s reliance on consensus 
as a decision rule. By expecting CSI’s committees to achieve consensus before EPA would take 
action, the agency constrained its ability to spur sector-based technological change and achieve 
significant environmental improvements. Although consensus-based processes have been touted 
as innovative and promising strategies for regulators to pursue in environmental policy, often in 
the absence of clear legislative mandates, EPA’s limited success with CSI illustrates some of the 
shortcomings of policymaking by consensus and suggests the need for clear legislative 
authorization in order to make significant regulatory change in the United States. 
 
 
I.  The Common Sense Initiative 
 
 EPA developed the Common Sense Initiative in the 1990s as part of the early Clinton 
Administration’s platform to “reinvent government” (Norberg-Bohm 1999). The agency has long 
faced criticism for the way it deals with environmental problems, including repeated claims that 
its regulations are burdensome, ineffective, and inefficient. EPA’s regulatory activities, grounded 
principally in environmental legislation adopted in the 1970s, have been characterized as 
“command-and-control” strategies that are targeted at individual pollutants in individual media, 
such as air, land, and water. While the agency’s past efforts have succeeded in reducing some 
environmental problems, they have been criticized for being too costly or for failing to achieve 
other goals, such as encouraging continuous environmental improvements or solving cross-
media environmental problems (Thompson 1996). The agency’s traditional approach has also 
frequently been criticized as being too adversarial, leading EPA to miss opportunities for 
purported win-win policy changes that could improve the environment at lower costs. 
 EPA launched CSI as the agency’s “flagship program” to overcome the limitations 
attributed to traditional environmental regulation (Browner 1998). From July 1994 through 




approaches to environmental pollution control. By bringing together industry, environmental 
groups, and other interested parties within a sector, the agency sought agreement on new and 
better ways of defining and achieving environmental performance goals.  
How well did this bold experiment work? The agency has claimed that CSI represented 
“an innovative approach” and “a pathfinding forum,” but the tangible results have been quite 
modest. CSI clearly had an “ambitious vision” (Fiorino 1996) and made a major commitment of 
agency resources, staff time, and support from agency leadership. However, nearly four years 
after the four-year Initiative came to an end, only about five of the approximately 30 
subcommittee recommendations (amounting to about 45 distinct projects) that emerged from the 
CSI process have resulted in actual revisions to EPA regulations. Moreover, relatively few of the 
project's accomplishments, according to the agency’s own reports, have produced technological 
innovations, pollution prevention, or resulted in any other significant policy change. The 
majority of projects resulted only in the production of educational material or the collection of 
information. 
 
 A. Goals of the Common Sense Initiative.   
 
 CSI was the “centerpiece” of the agency’s reinvention efforts (GAO 1997). In 
announcing CSI, Administrator Browner heralded it as “probably the biggest new direction in 
environmental protection since the founding of the EPA” (Lee 2001). The agency predicted that 
CSI would “result in significant improvements to current regulations, as well as proposals for 
Congress to consider” (EPA 1994). Lofty and revolutionary, the overarching goals of CSI were 
to make dramatic changes that would result in “cheaper, cleaner, smarter” solutions to 
environmental problems. Upon launching the program, Administrator Browner promised bold 
action: “I don’t think anyone in this country, whether environmental leader or corporate CEO, 
believes incremental steps will achieve the kind of future we all want” (EPA 1994).  
 The original advisory committee charter for CSI listed six objectives, or what EPA 
termed “programmatic elements,” of the project (EPA 1996a): 
 
1. Regulation. EPA aimed to review existing regulations for improvement opportunities, 
better environmental protection, and lower compliance costs. 
2. Pollution prevention. EPA sought to integrate pollution prevention into standard 
business practice within each of the sectors. 
3. Reporting and record keeping. EPA hoped to make record keeping easier for industry 
and more available to public. 
4. Compliance and enforcement. EPA wanted to encourage companies to exceed minimal 
requirements, while enhancing enforcement against intransigent violators. 
5. Permitting. EPA aimed to improve its permitting procedures by eliminating duplication 
and inconsistencies and enhancing public participation. 
6. Environmental technology. EPA aimed to provide industry with incentives for 
adopting innovative technologies to reduce pollution and lower costs.  
  
EPA renewed the original two-year charter of the CSI in 1996, and shortly afterwards the CSI 








7. Community Involvement. EPA would promote community involvement in 
environmental management and policy making; and  
8.  Emerging Issues.  EPA would identify future issues of concern within each sector 
(Kerr et al. 1999). 
 
 Launched in the same year that Philip Howard published his best-selling The Death of 
Common Sense (1994), CSI promised to cut through the senselessness of regulatory red tape.1 
Administrator Carol Browner claimed that CSI would lead to a “fundamentally different system” 
(EPA 1998), one that would make more sense both in terms of achieving environmental 
protection and reducing the cost and inconsistency associated with the existing system of 
environmental control. By focusing on specific industrial sectors, EPA sought to identify specific 
instances in which the existing regulatory approach hampered efforts to achieve sensible 
environmental improvements. The involvement of industry, government, and non-governmental 
organizations in consensus-based deliberations was designed to take advantage of the insights of 
those working within each sector and lend legitimacy to the resulting recommendations and 
projects.    
 
 B. The Structure of CSI   
 
 CSI had a two-level structure, a Council and specialized subcommittees; the members of 
both groups were appointed by the EPA Administrator for one-year renewable terms. These 
members included representatives from industry, national and local environmental organizations, 
environmental justice and community groups, labor unions, state, local, and federal 
governments. The Council consisted of approximately 30 members whose responsibility was to 
evaluate subcommittee project proposals and decide whether any recommended projects within 
each sector should be reported to the EPA Administrator. The EPA Administrator would 
consider those recommendations and if accepted would see that they were shepherded through 
the agency’s normal procedures for implementation.  
Six subcommittees reported to the Council, one for each industrial sector included in the 
project: 1. automobile manufacturing; 2. computers and electronics; 3. iron and steel; 4. metal 
finishing; 5. petroleum refining; and 6. printing. These subcommittees had the flexibility to do 
research, propose pilot projects, conduct preliminary information gathering, and recommend 
demonstration projects for consideration by the CSI Council. As Figure 1 shows, all but one of 
the CSI subcommittees for these sectors met for the entire length of the Initiative, from 1994-
1998. The subcommittee for one sector, metal finishing, actually was an extension of earlier 
efforts to reform regulation in this sector through EPA’s Sustainable Industries Program. 
Funded by various EPA program offices, CSI was established as an advisory committee 
in October, 1994.2 Meetings were conducted under standard advisory committee rules that 
require advance public notice of meetings, public access to meetings, the keeping of meeting 
minutes, and the opportunity for public comment. EPA retained the ultimate discretion and 
responsibility for implementing any CSI-recommended regulatory projects through its normal 







In addition to the six CSI Charter goals, CSI’s operating framework consisted of the use 
of consensus as the decision rule to be used by the Initiative’s advisory committee (Norberg-
Bohm 1999). Participants interpreted consensus to mean strict unanimity; this gave each player 
effective veto power (EPA 1997b). Several years into the process, EPA recognized the 
difficulties posed by strict unanimity as a decision-making principle.  In 1996, the agency 
responded to these difficulties by modestly redefining consensus as something that would be 
reached “when all Council members at the table can accept or support a particular position, even 
though the position may not be their first choice” (EPA 1996b). Even under this definition, 
consensus as a decision rule demanded that all the interests represented within CSI needed to 
reach agreement on new proposals or projects. 
 In 1997, midway through the Initiative, two reviews of CSI identified a number of 
problems associated with EPA’s use of consensus as a decision rule. The first review was 
conducted by the Scientific Consulting Group (SCG) at EPA’s request; the second was 
undertaken by the US General Accounting Office (GAO). In response to these reviews, EPA 
again re-evaluated its operating definition of consensus.  
 In a white paper on the consensus-decision-making principles (EPA 1997a), EPA argued 
that consensus was intended to bring out participants' underlying interests and stimulate creative 
problem solving. EPA urged the CSI Council, as well as CSI subcommittees and workgroups, to 
“try to reach full agreement on as many substantive and procedural issues as possible,” but 
allowed the Council to evaluate different member opinions that were submitted separately. The 
agency also allowed subcommittees and workgroups to determine if a project could go forward 
without a consensus (EPA 1997a). Some subcommittees, such as the one for the automobile 
sector, required strict unanimity, while others, such as the metal finishing subcommittee, 
followed a more informal interpretation (Kerr et al. 1999). 
 
II. What Did CSI Accomplish? 
 
 Each of the six sector subcommittees charted its own course toward a “cleaner, better, 
cheaper” regulatory system. EPA established broad goals along a number of dimensions of 
policy concern, and each committee independently tried to achieve consensus on more specific 
performance measures and ways of achieving these goals. The results, perhaps not surprisingly, 
varied across the several sectors, with over 40 diverse projects emerging from all the sectors 
taken together. These projects ranged from the development of compliance manuals for small 
firms to the development of voluntary environmental performance targets. This part of the paper 
first reviews the scope of the efforts within each subcommittee, and then provides an overall 
account of the accomplishments of CSI.  
 
 A. CSI Subcommittee Results   
 The sectors chosen for CSI varied. Some sectors consisted of a few large firms (such as 
automobile manufacturing), while others included a large number of small firms (such as the metal 
finishing and printing). Some sectors represented longstanding industrial activities (such as petroleum 







economy (computers and electronics). Figure 2 shows the number of meetings held for each CSI sector 
held during two years of the Initiative.  This section discusses what each of the six sector subcommittees 
accomplished through all of their meetings during CSI’s four-year lifespan. 
 Automobile Manufacturing.  The CSI subcommittee for automobile manufacturing set 
out initially to investigate how communities and the auto industry can interact better, look for 
alternatives to the existing regulatory system, and identify ways that industry could gain 
flexibility while reducing cost and maintaining environmental standards. Notwithstanding these 
goals, others have generally considered the automobile sector to be CSI’s biggest failure. This 
sector had a large number of meetings, worked on three projects, but achieved the least results of 
any sector, only addressing at best two of the eight CSI program goals.   
 The projects completed by the automotive subcommittee were little more than inventories 
and reports, database development, and a meager rule change recommendation. The proposed 
rule change addressed the mass-per-unit-area approach for total vehicle coating, basically 
seeking to provide information in a way that is both more understandable and consistent with 
international regulations. The automobile sector subcommittee concluded its efforts in 1997, a 
year before the other CSI subcommittees. 
 Computers and Electronics.  The computers and electronics industry is a comparatively 
“clean” industry when measured against traditional manufacturing. Nevertheless, it does have 
some significant environmental and occupational health and safety impacts. The subcommittee 
worked on 12 projects to develop improved strategies for reporting and public access to 
environmental information; overcome barriers to pollution prevention; encourage product 
stewardship and recycling; create alternative strategies for environmental management; and 
coordinate between environmental and workplace health policies. 
 The one project directed at environmental technology was structured to promote the 
creation of zero wastewater discharge systems, but was hindered by lack of clarity about how 
these systems could be incorporated into the current legal framework. Direct environmental 
results can probably be attained from the subcommittee’s cathode ray tube (CRT) recycling and 
sulfuric acid-recycling projects, but preexisting regulations required recycled CRT glass and 
used acid to be treated as hazardous waste. The subcommittee’s work did result in rule revisions 
to RCRA provisions for hazardous waste for CRT recycling to address this problem.  The 
remaining projects from this sector addressed reporting, information availability, and record 
keeping.   
 Iron and Steel.  The iron and steel industry consists of more than 1,000 facilities making 
and processing steel, with firms concentrated primarily in the Great Lakes region.  This 
subcommittee addressed six of CSI’s goals and pursued 12 projects. One of the subcommittee’s 
projects involved the creation of a website designed to make iron and steel firms aware of 
technologies to improve environmental performance. Another involved the convening of a 
workshop on ways to reduce spent pickle liquor wastes. Several other projects sought 
improvements in permitting and reporting requirements, resulting in contributions to the EPA’s 
Permit Reform Action Plan, which EPA approved in early 1999.  The iron and steel 
subcommittee recommendations were included in the “Cross Media Tasks” matrix (EPA 1999).     
 The sector’s biggest project, brownfields redevelopment, was designed to stimulate 
communities to bring polluted sites back into productive use, but it organized only two pilot 
projects, one in Alabama and one in Indiana. Only one project resulted in a regulation change 







subcommittee held over 100 meetings over the course of four years, its resulting projects were 
quite limited in scope and impact. 
 Metal Finishing.  The metal finishing industry provides parts that are used in almost 
every manufacturing process.  It is composed of more than 3000 small job shops and small 
businesses with limited capital and personnel, and with industry operations that affect the 
environment across air, land, and water.  In addition, the sector includes more than 8000 metal 
finishing operations that are part of larger manufacturing firms. 
 Metal finishing has sometimes been characterized as the most successful of CSI’s sectors.  
Unlike the other CSI sectors, the metal finishing industry began working closely with EPA in 
1990, developing projects through the Sustainable Industries Initiative (Kerr et al. 1999). The 
technical studies conducted during this earlier project, as well as the experience in collaborating 
together, may have enabled the metal finishing sector to work more quickly and effectively in 
the Common Sense Initiative. 
The metal finishing subcommittee pursued 13 projects that addressed each of the 
dimensions of CSI’s main goals.  Projects were designed to provide incentives for firms to go 
beyond compliance, but attention was also given to dealing with shops that are habitually out of 
compliance.  Recognizing that in many cases no alternatives exist to substances used in metal 
finishing, one project focused on reducing waste through improved operations or recycling 
techniques. The subcommittee developed strategies for testing innovative technologies, such as 
composite mesh pads and chemical fume suppressants to reduce chromium pollution.  Other 
projects included information and outreach activities; the creation of a regulatory team that 
addressed permitting and compliance issues; and an incentives program that would reward top 
performing companies with pollution prevention assistance and enforcement relief.  
 The Strategic Goals Program (SGP) that emerged from the metal finishing subcommittee 
in 1998 is cited as one of the most successful CSI projects (Kerr et al. 1999; EPA 1999). This 
voluntary program set clear national performance targets for facilities that, if met, would 
eventually result in performance by participating firms that exceeded compliance. Participating 
firms were to commit voluntarily to reducing the amount of metal disposed of as waste by 98 
percent, the amount of water used by 50 percent, and the amount of energy used by 25 percent, 
compared to a 1992 baseline (or six years prior to the launch of SGP). In addition, firms were 
expected to commit to making a 90 percent reduction in emissions of organic chemicals and a 50 
percent reduction in the land disposal of hazardous sludges, again compared with 1992 levels. 
 The overall goal of the SGP was to have 80 percent of the metal finishing facilities in the 
country achieve these reductions by 2002. By the end of the program, about 510 firms, or only 
about 15 percent of the independent shops in the industry, had agreed to participate in this 
program (EPA 2003a), although even fewer have remained active.3  Nevertheless, EPA claims 
that the program has resulted in significant reductions in pollution levels compared with levels 
reported by SGP firms for 1992, including a reduction of about two billion gallons of 
wastewater, five million pounds of organic chemical emissions, and 250,000 pounds of metals 
released into water (EPA 2003a). 
 While these absolute numbers sound impressive, in relative terms the overall 
environmental improvements attributable to SGP were probably less so. According to the latest 
SGP progress report available on the metal finishing industry’s website, SGP firms nearly 
achieved the program’s goals for their reductions in organics emissions, but they only came 
about half way to achieving other of the program’s goals (SGP 2001a). Of the approximately 300 







progress at all on reducing energy use or reducing the generation and shipment of sludge. 
Moreover, other data available on the industry’s website indicate that when overall 
environmental impacts are normalized by sales, participating firms showed little progress since 
1998 in all areas, and even increased their impacts modestly in terms of energy use and 
shipments of sludge (SGP 2001b, 2001c). The most progress reported by the participating firms 
occurred prior to the launch of SGP in 1998. At least with the data that the industry has made 
publicly available, it is difficult to conclude that the Strategic Goals Program has led to 
substantial environmental improvements, whatever else it may have achieved. 
 Petroleum Refining.  The petroleum refining industry consists of over 160 operating large 
and small petroleum refineries, concentrated principally along the Gulf Coast and in heavy 
industrialized areas on the east and west coasts. The petroleum refining subcommittee’s goals 
were broad and ambitious, focusing on regulation, permits, compliance, reporting, pollution 
prevention, and environmental technology. Yet, considering the large number of meetings of this 
subcommittee and its workgroups, progress by this committee over the four years turned out to 
be rather limited.   
 The petroleum-refining sector subcommittee worked on only three projects. One project 
studied the air pollution reporting requirements imposed on the sector. This project involved 
analysis of the impacts on a single refiner in Texas. Contrary to expectations, this study found, 
according to EPA (1999), that “the reporting requirements did not contain as much duplication 
as originally anticipated.” Nevertheless, the subcommittee still worked to develop an alternative 
refinery air reporting system. Another project aimed to reduce the pollution associated with leaks 
from refinery equipment and resulted in the planning of a voluntary program to encourage firms 
to prioritize their monitoring of equipment for leaks. This led to a third project that developed 
laser leak-detection technology that, according to EPA’s latest reports, is still being tested. 
 Printing.  The printing industry consists of more than 70,000 small business print shops 
diffused throughout the country and employing different printing processes. CSI’s printing sector 
subcommittee pursued two projects during the four years of the Initiative. The first project 
provided educational outreach to printers in New York City, informing them of pollution 
prevention measures they could use in their businesses and developing a technical assistance 
directory for printers in the city. The second project aimed to develop a more flexible, integrated 
system of issuing environmental permits, with incentives built into the permitting process to 
encourage firms to achieve a high level of environmental performance. This alternative 
permitting process has so far been piloted in only a few states. 
  
 B. Summarizing Overall Results   
 
 As this review of CSI subcommittees suggests, the Initiative involved many meetings that 
resulted in a number of projects. In most sectors, however, these projects failed to achieve results 
commensurate with EPA's ambitious goals. The Initiative has been reviewed twice by outside 
consultants commissioned by EPA. As noted above, the Scientific Consulting Group conducted a 
two-year review (SCG 1997) while CSI was still in progress. The US Government Accounting 
Office completed a review of CSI (GAO 1997) while the Initiative was in progress.  After CSI 
had ended, the firm of Kerr, Greiner, Andersen, and April, Inc. conducted a review (Kerr et al. 
1999). Taken together, these reviews suggest that CSI was generally tall on ambition but short 
on meaningful and measurable accomplishment. One subcommittee--metal finishing--composed 







subcommittees achieved much less. As one commenter observed about CSI and other EPA 
attempts at innovation, “despite the labor and resource-intensive nature of reinvention activity 
over the past several years, the tangible results of these experimental efforts have been widely 
viewed as disappointing” (Case 2001).   
 As Table 1 shows, the number and magnitude of projects coming out of four years of 
subcommittee work were rather small, considering the time and resources devoted by the 
individuals involved in the subcommittees. According to an estimate given to us by an EPA staff 
member involved in CSI, the agency devoted approximately 50-60 FTEs to CSI, while 
participants from outside the agency undoubtedly devoted still more time and resources. Table 1 
indicates that most of CSI’s projects were primarily intended to address the goals of regulatory 
reform and pollution prevention (51 percent combined), but this does not mean that CSI actually 
achieved this level of results.4  Kerr et al. (1999) reported that only five projects were complete 
at the end of CSI and found only eight projects that, if implemented, would be expected to have 
some level of direct environmental effects. 
 In order to make our own assessment of CSI, we coded the 45 CSI projects according to 
the modalities by which the subcommittee worked to achieve the project goals. These modalities, 
or project types, included: (1) education (e.g., directories, reports, websites); (2) research and 
information collection (e.g., databases, technical analyses, reports for data collection); (3) 
recommended policy change (e.g., regulations, new permit process); (4) development of new 
technology; (5) voluntary industry action; and (6) discussion/airing of views. 
 As Table 2 shows, 47 percent of the projects consisted only of information and data 
collection and an additional 24 percent resulted in educational products, few of which were used 
to implement any innovative programs with direct environmental results.5  Nearly three quarters 
of CSI’s projects aimed only to conduct research or provide some form of educational outreach. 
Moreover, no more than about one-tenth of the total projects were completed by the end of CSI.  
 In addition, only two CSI projects promote innovations in environmental technology, 
neither of which was completed by the end of CSI. By that time, the handful of subcommittee 
recommendations endorsed by the council and submitted to EPA had resulted in the agency 
taking steps to propose or issue only four new rules or revisions to existing regulations: (1) 
amendments to permit requirements for the iron and steel sector; (2) a rulemaking on a mass-per-
unit area approach for automobile coating; (3) a rule change to extend the accumulation 
requirement for metal finishing waste to promote on-site recovery; and (4) a proposed 
rulemaking to streamline requirements for CRT recycling. 
 
 C. Post-CSI Sector Projects   
 Although CSI came to an end in 1998, three out of six CSI subcommittees (metal 
finishing, printing, and petroleum refining) were incorporated for a time as part of a new sector 
committee under the agency’s larger National Advisory Committee on Environmental Policy 
(NACEPT). Meeting for the first time in April, 1999, NACEPT’s sectors committee sought to 
provide EPA a way to continue to receive stakeholder input toward a sector-based approach to 








 In addition, before disbanding, the CSI Council prepared a “Sector Action Plan” that 
would serve as a basis for further work. The 2000 Sector Action Plan proposed continuing 
projects in six categories that were similar to CSI goals: (1) permitting, (2) enforcement and 
compliance assurance, (3) rule making, (4) solving regional problems, (5) building voluntary 
partnerships with the private sector to improve environmental performance, and (6) research and 
applications of science. Table 3 provides a summary of projects in the FY 2000 Sector Action 
Plan for CSI projects that continued (EPA 2000). None of these projects were new, but some had 
moved from the discussion stage to pilot projects. One additional regulatory proposal, on zero 
wastewater discharge systems for the computer and electronics sector, was initiated in 2000. As 
of two years after the end of CSI, as many as 30 uncompleted CSI projects were apparently still 
in progress through the NACEPT Sector Program or through internal EPA development (Table 
3).6 
 During the Bush Administration, the EPA continued to pursue sector-focused efforts.  
The agency’s goals shifted away from the kind of dramatic changes that CSI had been intended 
to achieve toward a more limited set of objectives.  Proposed in September 2002 and launched in 
May 2003, EPA’s new Sector Strategies Program (SSP) aimed: (1) to increase the use of 
environmental management systems, (2) reduce “government-imposed” barriers to 
environmental improvement, and (3) measure performance outcomes (EPA 2003b).  As of mid-
2003, SSP involved a total of twelve sectors, including such industries as agribusiness, higher 
education, and seaports (EPA 2003c).  The only CSI sectors to be associated with SSP were the 
metal finishing and iron and steel manufacturing sectors. 
 
 
III. Assessing the CSI Experience 
 
 Administrator Browner envisioned CSI as a means for creating a “fundamentally 
different system...[through] a pathfinding forum for breaking through some of the biggest 
constraints associated with the current environmental regulatory system--the use of single media 
approach to environmental protection and the adversarial relationships that have built up among 
stakeholders” (EPA 1998; 2001).  As an innovative approach to dealing with the complexities of 
environmental regulation and management, CSI’s sector-based, consensus-driven concept may 
have held some intuitive appeal, but the changes it produced have been far from significant (Kerr 
et al., 1999).   
 
A. Measuring Success  
 
 Although EPA described the Common Sense Initiative as an experiment, it was not 
established in a way that would enable the agency to assess the impact of the program with rigor. 
Evaluating the impact of the Initiative calls for more than simply listing the various projects of 
each sector subcommittee. To assess its impact on environmental policy it should be 
appropriately compared with other efforts.   
 Some CSI projects presumably affected the behavior of industrial actors and perhaps 
even resulted in cost savings and environmental improvements. The key question for evaluation 







been achieved without it. In other words, what difference did CSI make? The answer to this 
question depends in part on the counterfactual, or what would have happened in the absence of 
the program (Coglianese 2002).  If one were to assume that nothing at all would have been 
accomplished in the absence of CSI’s consensus-based, sectoral approach, then its impact would 
presumably be viewed as positive. Such an assumption would, however, be unrealistic for two 
reasons. 
 First, EPA had pursued other, less prominent sector-based initiatives in the past, such as 
the Design for the Environment project, Sustainable Industries project, and the Cluster Program. 
These other initiatives had goals similar to CSI’s and they too resulted in some limited projects. 
These earlier efforts tended to involve only the affected industry and EPA, and seem to have 
encountered some resistance from environmental groups. Had EPA continued these programs for 
four additional years, perhaps expanding them to other sectors, it might have achieved the same 
kind of results that followed CSI. In fact, the one CSI sector that appeared to others to have 
accomplished the most, metal finishing, had been one of three sectors included in EPA’s 
Sustainable Industries Project. It is reasonable to consider how much of this sector’s productivity 
should be attributed to CSI and how much to the head start it made during the Sustainable 
Industries project.  The Kerr Report (1999) indicates that many participants in the metal 
finishing subcommittee credit the Sustainable Industries project for providing the foundation on 
which the CSI subcommittee achieved its successes. With a comparable amount of effort over 
four additional years, the metal finishing group within the Sustainable Industries project might 
well have achieved as much as, if not perhaps more than, the CSI metal finishing subcommittee 
accomplished. 
Second, not only might EPA have achieved similar accomplishments had it continued its 
pre-CSI sector-based programs, but it also might have brought about more environmental 
improvement had it devoted a comparable amount of staff effort to exercising its traditional 
regulatory authority. CSI demanded many hours of EPA staff time in managing the 
subcommittees and working on projects. Compared with the nearly 300 final regulations the 
EPA issues each year, CSI stimulated only four proposed regulatory changes over the course of 
four years time—one half of one percent of all the rules issued during that time. This is not a 
significant accomplishment. EPA may well have generated more environmental improvement by 
devoting the same resources it invested in CSI to the development of even a single regulation, if 
that rule forced firms to develop promising new technologies or achieve substantial new 
milestones in environmental protection.   
 EPA did not develop a way to measure the environmental impacts associated with the 
Common Sense Initiative that could be used to compare its outcomes with those of other 
regulatory efforts. It would be quite difficult to develop such measures, if only because most of 
the CSI projects were educational or research efforts only indirectly connected with 
environmental improvement (Table 2). However, even in the absence of such measures, the 
counterfactual scenario--what would have happened in the absence of CSI--was probably not an 
empty set. In other words, had EPA not pursued CSI, the agency would undoubtedly have taken 
other actions to seek environmental improvement. One cannot reasonably conclude that CSI had 
an impact merely because it successfully completed some projects. 
Even if CSI had an impact that went beyond what alternative courses of action would 
have achieved, the objective of CSI was not simply to have such a greater impact. Instead, CSI 
was conceived as a ground-breaking program, one that sought to overcome the limitations of the 







future (EPA 1998). The hope among EPA staff was to craft new approaches that would achieve 
integrated environmental management and better environmental results, all at a lower cost. When 
evaluated against these original aspirations that the program would bring about fundamental 
change, CSI clearly was not a successful initiative. The Kerr (1999) report indicates that few 
participants “felt that they had succeeded in addressing issues of the scope they had anticipated 
at the outset of CSI. CSI made very little progress in addressing broad regulatory changes.” 
For example, the flagship program of the metal finishing subcommittee was its Strategic 
Goals Program (SGP), hailed by some as the most significant of all the CSI projects (Kerr et al., 
1999). As discussed earlier, this was a voluntary program encouraging metal finishing firms to 
reduce disposal of metals, water and energy usage, and toxic releases by specific targets by 2002 
(as a percentage of 1992 levels). Even though the program had the lofty goal of getting 80 
percent of the firms in the sector to make significant environmental improvements, by the 
program’s end no more than about 15 percent of the independent metal finishing shops had 
chosen to participate. As a result, even if SGP achieved some results that might not otherwise 
have occurred, its overall impact falls far short of achieving the kind of regulatory 
transformation EPA anticipated at the outset of CSI. Moreover, while participating companies 
and their improvements in environmental performance can be applauded, some in the metal 
finishing sector probably viewed the SGP as a means of staving off impending regulation (Kerr 
et al. 1999).7 If the limited voluntary efforts associated with SGP are compared with the likely 
impact of a new environmental regulation that would have covered all 3,000 firms, instead of 
just the small fraction who participated in SGP, the environmental impacts of SGP can hardly 
seem all that significant. 
The most cited accomplishment of CSI overall has been its positive impact on 
relationships between government, industry, environmental groups, and the other organizations 
involved in CSI discussions (Davies and Mazurek, 1996; SCG 1997; Kerr 1999). While this may 
well be a noteworthy accomplishment, it could be considered little more than a post-hoc 
justification for four intensive years of meetings. In themselves, improved organizational 
relationships do not translate into direct effects in terms of improvements in environmental 
regulation, economic efficiency, or improved environmental conditions, the original goals of the 
Initiative.  Moreover, almost any intensive group process involving several years of deliberation 
could claim some credit for helping people learn more about each other and about how to work 
with each other. In some cases CSI clearly did not even achieve this goal. The automobile sector 
had a history of adversarial relationships with stakeholders and the CSI consensus process did 
little to improve them. 
 
 B. Lessons of CSI  
CSI faced fundamental limitations on the degree of change it could produce, limitations 
which resulted on the one hand from the parameters specified in current environmental 
legislation and on the other hand from the kind of consensus-based, “multi-stakeholder” process 
EPA employed in an effort to overcome problems in the existing system. The key lesson to be 
gleaned from the Common Sense Initiative is that consensus-based processes are ineffective 
means of overcoming perceived limitations in existing statutory law. Overcoming any such 
limitations will require more than just consensus-building in the administrative process. They 







CSI was designed to overcome the media-specific biases in existing law that inhibit firms 
from managing their overall environmental impacts in an integrated fashion. The current system 
of environmental regulation in the United States, as noted earlier, is usually criticized for failing 
to confront tradeoffs and spillover environmental effects across air, water, and groundwater (The 
Aspen Institute 1996; Enterprise for the Environment,1998; Davies and Mazurek 1996; Esty and 
Chertow 1997). The EPA hoped that CSI would provide more focused improvements to 
environmental policy based on the specific needs of the industrial sectors included in the 
Initiative, rather than appearing to take the “one size fits all” approach for which EPA has often 
been criticized (Fiorino, 1996). 
Unfortunately, because the problems CSI was designed to address were embedded in 
underlying environmental statutes, EPA came up against some significant limitations in what it 
could accomplish through administrative actions. EPA cannot change these statutes; in fact, they 
are written to constrain and direct the kinds of actions EPA takes. Statutes not only direct EPA’s 
priorities (Landy, Roberts, and Thomas, 1994), but also stipulate numerous judicially 
enforceable deadlines that the agency must meet and often specify the regulatory strategies EPA 
must use in great detail. 
Existing environmental statutes limit EPA's opportunities to waive statutory requirements 
and they provide no catchall provision granting EPA authority to develop alternative regulatory 
systems. Moreover, most environmental statutes authorize citizen suits against firms that fail to 
comply with the letter of the law, meaning that even if EPA did grant firms exemptions or 
waivers from existing requirements these same firms might still be pursued in court by 
environmental organizations.   
Faced with these kinds of legal limitations, EPA tried to use sector-based consensus 
building to develop innovative new approaches through the Common Sense Initiative. By 
forging agreement across varied interest groups, the agency hoped to create a degree of 
legitimacy around the projects that emerged from CSI. Legitimacy, after all, is sometimes 
thought to be enhanced by consensus processes (Freeman and Langbein 2001). EPA officials 
hoped that consensus would ensure that the innovations adopted by CSI would unify political 
support, thus increasing the likelihood that a wide range of actors would view its outcomes as 
sensible and implement them without much challenge.  
Although consensus-building has long been viewed as having this kind of strategic 
advantage, in practice consensus building faces significant limitations (Coglianese 2001a). In 
fact, CSI’s relatively tepid outcomes can be largely attributed to the limitations of consensus as 
strategy for making policy decisions.  There was simply no way that EPA could have 
accomplished through consensus-building anything remotely as dramatic as what it originally set 
out to accomplish. 
 Consensus building relies on agreement, usually unanimous agreement, among 
participants in a policy-making process. As defined in CSI’s original statement of operating 
principles, consensus would be “reached when all Council members at the table can accept or 
support a particular position, even though the position may not be their first choice” (EPA 1997). 
By February of 1997, an evaluation showed that subcommittees were often implementing the 
consensus standard in a way that required unanimity and that, as a result, CSI participants 
expressed dissatisfaction with the resulting delays (SCG 1997). As Davies and Mazurek (1996) 
reported toward the midpoint of CSI, “trying to persuade all parties to come to an agreement has 
proven so problematic that the agency has considered moving away from a strict interpretation of 







throughout the duration of CSI, urging subcommittees to “attempt to reach full agreement on as 
many substantive and procedural issues as possible,” the agency did subsequently relax its 
decision rule to permit projects to go forward even in the absence of full agreement (EPA 1997). 
As is evident in international relations where consensus operates as a decision-making 
norm, building consensus is not easy. It is difficult to find any broad group of individuals with 
divergent interests who can come to agreement on major policy issues, especially when they 
arrive at the table with different opinions, assumptions, and value commitments. For this reason, 
the process of building consensus over policy innovations can take more time and demand more 
resources than processes not based on consensus (Thompson 1996; Coglianese 1997; 2001b). In 
addition, the outcomes of consensus processes tend to focus on the most tractable, and often least 
important, policy problems; to rely on agreement over imprecise or general principles rather than 
on concrete operational results; and to reflect what amounts to a lowest common denominator of 
all the participating interests (Coglianese 2001a). 
 The results of EPA’s Common Sense Initiative reflect these limitations. For example, 
CSI resulted in a number of narrow, relatively tractable projects, instead of the ambitious 
redesign of the regulatory system announced by EPA at the outset of the Initiative or as reflected 
in EPA’s goals for the Initiative. The Kerr Report (1999) indicates that, as time went on, 
participants in CSI reduced their expectations about what CSI could achieve, choosing to work 
on areas in which agreement was possible, such as training manuals, case studies and public 
outreach, not necessarily on those areas most in need of fixing (Table 2). These informational 
and administrative projects had narrow impacts that failed to generate the kind of conflicts that 
might have arisen over more ambitious policy efforts. 
 Nothing dramatic resulted from CSI because the agency chose to pursue its agenda 
through consensus. In consensus-building, as negotiations wear on agreements can drift toward 
the lowest common denominator of the players. In the case of environmental protection, which 
requires firms to internalize the social costs of their activities, industry players from each sector 
are unlikely to agree to changes that would require costly new technologies, at least not without 
some impending threat of government regulation (Caldart and Ashford 1999). After all, 
innovation usually comes with risks-–both to the firm and to the government.  As a result, it 
should not be surprising that CSI achieved very little in the way of promoting new 
environmental technologies. 
 Furthermore, because the EPA needed to seek consensus in the absence of clear 
regulatory authority, most of the projects that emerged from CSI were strictly voluntary. The 
metal finishing sector’s Strategic Goals Program, for example, was designed to encourage firms 
to make environmental improvements that exceeded existing regulatory requirements. SGP may 
well have led some firms to achieve environmental improvements that they would not otherwise 
have achieved, but it seems likely that the SGP was more attractive to firms that were already 
committed to maintaining a solid environmental record and perhaps had already achieved results 
that went beyond compliance with existing requirements. Any policy program that relies on 
attracting volunteers runs the risk of attracting mainly the kind of participants that the program 











 CSI’s focus on fine-tuning environmental regulation to the specific circumstances of 
different industrial sectors may hold the potential for developing more sensible and effective 
methods of environmental protection. However, CSI’s objectives were pursued under the 
constraints of consensus as a decision rule, and consequently the Initiative struggled to achieve 
much of significance. CSI’s ultimate failure to transform the existing regulatory system, or even 
to result in significant innovations, stems from the limitations of consensus-building, especially 
in the face of statutory constraints on regulatory change. 
 The chief lesson to be learned from CSI appears to be that fundamental change in a 
regulatory system that is governed by a highly detailed set of statutes will come about neither 
without changing those statutes nor through consensus. As Vicki Norberg-Bohm (1998) 
observed about similar kinds of initiatives aimed at so-called green design and manufacturing, 
“expecting these initiatives alone to lead to extensive private sector efforts in environmentally 
conscious design and manufacturing is truly asking the tail to wag the dog. Legislation which 
provides stronger incentives over an appropriate time frame will be needed.” Deliberative, 
sector-based efforts such as CSI may well serve a useful purpose of generating some new ideas, 
making incremental changes, or providing feedback to those involved in the regular policy 
process, but we should not expect that consensus-building will provide the route to a 
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1  When originally conceived, CSI was called the “Green Sectors Project” but was renamed to 
fit the government reform rhetoric of common sense. For a further example of this rhetoric, see 
Gore (1995). 
 
2  See Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), Pub. L. 92-463, Oct. 6, 1972; 86 Stat 770 as 
amended by Pub. L. 94-409, Sec 5(c) Sept. 13, 19763. 
 
3   Although more than 500 firms were “part of” SGP, apparently about 115 of these firms never 
submitted any data on their environmental progress (http://www.strategicgoals.org/reports2/ 
review.cfm?state=all&requesttimeout=200, accessed September 2, 2003).  Strikingly, the 
National Metal Finishing Strategic Goals Program’s website provides facility reports for the year 
2002 from only about 130 facilities (http://www.strategicgoals.org/02cards/card.cfm, accessed 
September 2, 2003). 
 
4   Some projects addressed more than one goal, but adding the secondary project goals does not 
dramatically affect the distribution of projects reflected in Table 1. With secondary goals added, 
the distribution of projects by goal is as follows: 19 percent regulation, 22 percent pollution 
prevention, eight percent record-keeping/reporting, 11 percent compliance and enforcement, 12 
percent environmental technology, 14 percent involving communities, and five percent future 
issues.   
  
5  As with the CSI project goals, adding in the secondary modalities or project types does not 
appreciably affect the distribution of projects among the different modalities (46 percent 
research/information; 30 percent education; 15 percent policy change; four percent discussion; 
three percent new technology; and one percent voluntary industry action). 
 
6  The projects in the three subcommittee columns that are not continuing as FACA committees 
under NACEPT (automobiles, computers and electronics, and iron and steel) were in progress at 








7  Metal finishing firms were facing brownfields issues and effluent guidelines that, in 
combination with the general need for flexibility for small business, may have helped provide the 
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Figure 1.  Timeline of CSI Subcommittees 
        1994   1995   1996   1997 1998 
 
Metal Refinishing     CSI---------------------------------Dec 
Printing     CSI---------------------------------Dec 
Iron and Steel      CSI---------------------------------May 
Petroleum Refining        CSI---------------------------------Dec  
Automobile Manufacturing      CSI------------------------Mar 
Computers and Electronics     CSI---------------------------------Dec 
 




























































Auto 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Comp/Elect 5 3 3 0 0 0 1 0 12 
Iron/Steel 1 0 1 4 2 1 3 0 12 
Metal Fin 1 7 1 1 0 1 1 1 13 
Petrol 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 3 
Printing 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Total  9 14 6 5 2 2 6 1 45 
Percent of 
Projects  
20.0 31.1 13.3 11.1 4.4 4.4 13.3 2.2  
  
 
Table 2.  Project Modalities 
 % of All Projects 
Research/information collection 47 
Education 24 
Recommended policy change 20 
Discussion/airing of views 4 
Development of new technology 2 
Voluntary industry action 2 
 
 

















Permitting 0 0 2 0 0 1 3 
Rulemaking 1 3 1 1 0 0 6 
Enforcement/ 
ComplianceAssurance 0 1 2 3 1 0 7 
Solving  
Regional Problems 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Building Voluntary 
Partnerships 1 2 2 3 0 0 8 
Research & Science (e.g., P2, 
technology) 0 0 0 4 1 0 5 
Total 2 6 8 11 2 1 30 
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